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This article addresses a key contemporary problem confronting the Strasbourg Court. While it is well 
established that seeking the historical truth is an integral part of the right to freedom of expression, it 
cannot be the role of the Strasbourg Court to arbitrate underlying historical issues (Dzhugashvili v. 
Russia, 2014). Still less can it be for the Court to decide on individual or collective guilt for crimes of 
the past, rather than on violations of Convention rights. For example, the Court has found many 
violations of human rights in the more recent armed conflicts in Northern Ireland, South-East Turkey, 
Chechnya, or the Basque Country, but has never sought to pronounce on the legal or moral issues 
underlying these conflicts, or on their deep historical roots. However, the existence of the USSR for 
more than 70 years, and 12 years of Nazism in Germany, leading to WWII, dominated the 20th 
century in Europe. These have both been described as totalitarian regimes. The fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989 followed by the collapse of the USSR in 1991 led to dramatic changes not only in statehood 
and political systems, but also a strong desire for states emerging from the USSR or Soviet 
domination to purge the past, and to identify and punish wrongdoers. Various forms of lustration have 
been a product of this desire, with the exception of the Russian Federation, where the characterization 
and proper evaluation of its Soviet past are questions still unresolved. Increasingly the Strasbourg 
Court has been called on to decide highly controversial cases, for example Zdanoka v. Latvia (2006), 
Vajnai v. Hungary (2008), Kononov v. Latvia (2010), Korobov v. Estonia (2013), Soro v. Estonia 
(2015). The author was counsel for the applicants in some of these cases. I ask: what are the dangers 
and challenges for the Strasbourg Court in adjudicating such cases, and how can it avoid the 
appearance of taking sides in bitter and intractable arguments? 
 
1 Introduction 
It is an integral part of the right to freedom of expression to seek the historical truth. But it cannot be 
the role of the Strasbourg Court to arbitrate underlying historical issues (Dzhugashvili v. Russia, 
2014). Still less can it be for the Court to decide on individual or collective guilt for crimes of the 
past, rather than on violations of Convention rights. For example, the Court has found many violations 
of human rights in the more recent armed conflicts in Northern Ireland, South-East Turkey, Chechnya, 
or the Basque Country, but has never sought to pronounce on the legal or moral issues underlying 
these conflicts, or on their deep historical roots. However, the existence of the USSR for more than 70 
years, and 12 years of Nazism in Germany, leading to WWII, dominated the 20th century in Europe. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 followed by the collapse of the USSR in 1991 led to dramatic 
changes not only in statehood and political system, but also a strong desire on states emerging from 
the USSR or Soviet domination to purge the past, and to identify and punish wrongdoers. Various 
forms of lustration have been a product of this desire, with the exception of the Russian Federation, 
where the characterisation and proper evaluation of its Soviet past are questions still unresolved. 





Zdanoka v. Latvia (2006), Vajnai v. Hungary (2008), Kononov v. Latvia (2010), Korobov v. Estonia 
(2013), Soro v. Estonia (2015). The author was counsel for the applicants in some of these cases. This 
article asks: what are the dangers and challenges for the Strasbourg Court in adjudicating such cases, 
and how can it avoid the appearance of taking sides in bitter and intractable arguments? 
In their partly dissenting Opinion for the Grand Chamber judgment in Janowiec and Others v. 
Russia,
1
 Judges Ziemele, De Gaetano, Laffranque and Keller agreed with the joint partly dissenting 
opinion of Judges Spielmann, Villiger and Nußberger in the Chamber Judgment of 16 April 2012, as 
to “the gravity and magnitude of the war crimes committed in 1940 in Katyn, Kharkov and Tver, 
coupled with the attitude of the Russian authorities after the entry into force of the Convention”. 
There can be no question, as a matter of fact, that the most serious crimes were committed on the 
direct instructions of the leaders of the USSR. But they concluded: 
We express our profound disagreement and dissatisfaction with the findings of the majority in 
this case, a case of most hideous human rights violations, which turn the applicants’ long 
history of justice delayed into a permanent case of justice denied. 
What had the applicants been denied? This chapter explores that very question under a number of 
headings, and also draws upon my own experience as an advocate in one of the leading cases on the 
topic, Ždanoka v. Latvia.
2
  
I stand by the undoubted historical record as to real crimes. This record is not a matter for dispute, or 
for “social construction”. The question, however, is the extent to which such crimes are susceptible to 
redress through the European Court of Human Rights. 
The first question which arises is why this is such a live issue.  
I turn therefore first to the question of the Holocaust, and the way in which it has been treated by the 
Strasbourg Court. Second, I reflect on the question of the crimes of Communism, before turning, 
thirdly, to the next step, which is the practice, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, of lustration. 
Fourth, I broach the subject of the “right to truth” and whether the Court should get involved at all in 
issues of historical truth; and fifthly, the controversial topic of the manipulation of “truth” by the 
“communist” regimes, drawing on some provocative work by Eric Heinze. Sixth, I examine in some 
detail cases which have arisen in Latvia, as explored by Nils Muižnieks, the Council of Europe’s 
Commissioner for Human Rights, in his survey, which I take to task for its normative criterion, 
namely whether the Strasbourg Court has engaged with the issue of the crimes of the USSR. It will be 
apparent that in several cases, including two in which I represented the applicants, I have some 
sympathy with the Russian position. I also, seventh, review three more recent cases. I conclude with 
some shocking behavior by Russia, seeking to re-write history in a manner which lays a person open 
to criminal prosecution simply for telling the historical truth. These cases, and another recent case 
against Switzerland, turn on the extent of freedom of expression. But the vexed question of 
retrospective criminalization of partisan activity during World War II will not go away. 
 
2 The Holocaust 
I start with the Holocaust, a crime on an extraordinary scale whose historical existence is not only 
beyond question, but whose denial is now treated as a crime in many countries of the Council of 
Europe. Like the Katyn massacre, this is an event which undeniably took place.  
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 ECtHR, Appl.nos.55508/07 and 29520/09, Janowiec and Others v. Russia, judgment of 21 October 2013. 
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Paula Lobba examined the spread of “denialism” since the 1990s, and noted that states punishing only 
denial of the Holocaust include: Germany, France, Austria and Belgium; states banning denial of a 
wider class of crimes include: Spain, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Slovenia, Latvia and 
Malta.
3
 Other states which do not consider the gravity of this kind of utterance alone to be such as to 
warrant criminal punishment include the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Finland, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway. Lobba added that despite the lack of express criminalization in 
these countries, denialism might still be punished in so far as it falls within existing laws against hate 
speech.
4
 The European Union had, she pointed out, sought to reconcile these two rival positions by 
introducing Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA.
5
 Whereas the declared goal of this Framework 
Decision was to harmonize criminal measures against racism and xenophobia, such European 
intervention in effect broadened the original reach of the crime of denialism to embrace also negation 
of nearly all core international crimes.
6
 As Lobba noted, this development had drawn extensive 
comment from her and other scholars.
7
 
Her focus was on the European Court of Human Rights and its recent case-law: 
The denial of the Holocaust triggers the application of Article 17 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) – also known as the abuse clause – which causes through its 
‘guillotine effect’
8
 the categorical exclusion of a given expression from the protection of the 
Convention. In other words, when faced with a conduct of this sort, the Court need not 
proceed to examine the merits of the complaint but, rather, declares it inadmissible on a prima 
facie assessment. 
Lobba’s intention was to highlight the dangers flowing from the ample interpretation given to Article 
17, the “abuse clause”, by the Strasbourg Court since Lehideux and Isorni v. France,
9
 especially in 
cases concerning Holocaust denial, and the implications for freedom of expression.
10
 Her warning was 
expressed in strong terms: 
The problems raised by the Court’s development in this field, therefore, are far from being 
unimportant or peripheral. It is not a pardonable sort of ‘original sin’ that we are now 
discussing. Rather, there is a need to reveal the dangers of case law that is potentially capable 
of expanding the scope of validity of criminal restrictions on freedom of expression in an area 
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Exceptional Regime”, 26(1) European Journal of International Law (2015), 237-253, at 238, note 4. 
4
 Ibid., at 238, note 5. 
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discrimination raciale”, 46 RTDH (2001) 665-688. 
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– the formation and preservation of a shared memory on a country’s founding past events – 
that is critical to the contemporaneous demands of identity building.
11
 
However, as Maria Mälksoo (to whose important scholarship I return in this chapter) has pointed out,  
Through painful memory work after the war, the old EU member states have consolidated the 
position of the Holocaust as the moral absolute. Attempts to push Communist crimes into a 
similar framework by asserting the essential equivalence between the crimes of Europe’s two 
totalitarian regimes are usually regarded with contempt. This background gives cause for 
scepticism about the applicability of the so-called Holocaust-based tactics when seeking 
universal condemnation of Communist crimes.
12
 
In further comments, she noted a “noticeable imbalance” in the remembering and study of recent 
history in Eastern and Western Europe, comparing the rigor and depth of analysis with regard to the 
crimes of the Nazis, especially the Holocaust, with the crimes of the communist regimes of the former 
Soviet bloc. In her view, this was largely due to the fact that the legacy of Nazism was “more 
immanent” and for that reason reflection on it more urgent. Another factor was that there had never 
been a Soviet Nuremberg process. She cited the late Estonian President Lennart Meri, who remarked 




I already mentioned Katyn. So, what about the crimes committed by the war-time anti-Nazi allies? 
 
3 The Crimes of Communism 
In December 2010, the European Commission (EC) rejected calls from six East European countries
14
 
to criminalize denial of crimes perpetrated by communist regimes, in the same way as a number of 
EU countries have banned the public condoning, denial, and gross trivialization of the Holocaust.
15
 
This decision was based in part on a study commissioned by the EC, and produced in 2010, in the 
shape of the “Study on how the memory of crimes committed by totalitarian regimes in Europe is 
dealt with in the Member States”, by Professor Dr. Carlos Closa Montero.
16
  
In the overview of his Report, he noted that in relation to justice for victims, many Member States 
have adopted extensive measures aiming at rehabilitation of victims, reparation and restitution of 
property,
17
 but that 11 Member States have no legislation on denial of crimes of genocide, crimes 
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against humanity and war crimes,
18
 and that only two Member States (the Czech Republic and 




Maria Mälksoo noted that public hearings and international conferences on the subject of crimes 
committed by totalitarian regimes had been organized under the aegis of the Slovenian, Czech, 
Hungarian, and Polish EU Presidencies in 2008–2011,
20
 but in view of the failure of the 2010 
initiative at the EC, commented: 
The discursive linkage of communist regimes with criminality has enabled the reinforcement 
of their moral illegitimacy and incompatibility with “European values.” While the flow of 
political declarations by various European organizations supporting the condemnation of 
totalitarian communist regimes has been quite noteworthy, the legal score card of 




This last remark is an understatement: the European Union does not wish to get involved in the 
writing or re-writing of history. 
 
4 Lustration 
Lustration is another area where issues of historical truth render complex issues even more 
complicated and contentious. 
Adam Czarnota, in his article “Lustration, Decommunisation and the Rule of Law”,
22
 argued that 
lustration “generally plays a positive role in laying down foundations for a cleaner public sphere and 
rule of law and democracy, and also that the debates which lustration have stimulated have played a 
very positive role in building rule of law cultures in the countries in question.”
23
 He identified three 
potentially irreconcilable demands associated with lustration: seeking to instantiate the rule of law in 
the present, seeking to repair the consequences of its absence in the past, and seeking to establish 
conditions for it in the future.
24
 
This is against the background that “[i]n the Western legal tradition law was not a tool for dealing 
with historical justice. It was a well-designed instrument for coping with injustice on smaller scales.” 
He also noted that “Generally those who wanted some sort of transitional justice measures to be 
applied immediately come from the right of the political spectrum.”
25
 
According to Wojciech Sadurski’s authoritative definition,
26
 “‘lustration’ applies to the screening of 
persons seeking to occupy… certain public positions for evidence of involvement with the communist 
regime (mainly with the security service apparatus), while ‘decommunisation’ refers to the exclusion 
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of certain categories of ex-Communist officials to run for, and occupy, certain public positions in the 
new system…. The two have often been lumped together.”  
This lumping together is what has given rise to grave concerns by the Venice Commission in relation 
to Ukraine, and also by the Strasbourg Court, as to the way in which lustration can take on the 
elements of revenge. 
In this vein, Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou has argued:  
Suitability of many of those lustration laws were considered by the European Court of Human 
Rights and unsurprisingly the Court found some of them in violation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This is so because these laws deeply interfere with the life of 
the affected persons and the safeguards cannot always prevent excessive interferences. 
Lustration goes beyond the criminal justice system. It is supposed to quickly heal the legal 
system in the circumstances of transition. It is a paracriminal procedure which has to be 




And Magdalena Kaj and Megan Metzger commented,
28
 with regard to Poland:
29
 
The goal of lustration should be a coming to terms with the past and the development of 
stronger potential for a strong democratic society. Jacek Żakowski, however, comments: ‘The 
goal of lustration is not to clarify the past, as it should be, but to create traps for hundreds of 
thousands of people and to give the social elites of the culture the right to decide who is in a 
proper social category and who is not’. He argues that the real motivations of lustration were 
political revenge. In fact, he argues that the new law on lustration embodies totalitarian, not 
democratic principles. 
Also with regard to Poland, Natalia Letki adds:
30
  
Again, lustration should not be perceived as a punishment or revenge. For example, in Polish 
lustration law there is no punishment for the act of collaboration with the secret service as 
such, but a person is 'disqualified' if proven to have lied about their collaboration. Therefore, 
lustration, although based on acts that took place in the past, does not have a retroactive 
character: it is embedded in the forward-looking perspective. 
 
5 The right to truth 
In its Decision in Yevgeny Dzhugashvili v. Russia
31
 in 2014 the Court reiterated that: 
… it is an integral part of freedom of expression, guaranteed under Article 10 of the 
Convention, to seek historical truth. It is not the Court’s role to arbitrate the underlying 
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historical issues, which are part of a continuing debate between historians. A contrary finding 
would open the way to a judicial intervention in historical debate and inevitably shift the 
respective historical discussions from public forums to courtrooms. 
In 2010, Károly Bárd emphasised the dangers entailed in treating the courts as mechanisms for 
establishing the historical truth.
32
 He focused on two cases to which I will return, the Grand Chamber 
judgment in Korbely v. Hungary,
33
 and the Chamber judgment (later reversed in the Grand Chamber) 
in Kononov v. Latvia.
34
 In Kononov the Chamber considered a complaint on the trial of the applicant 
who, as established by the Latvian courts, had been involved in 1944 in the killing of Latvian villagers 
in retaliation for their collaboration with the Germans. The question was basically whether the 
conviction of the applicant had any basis either in international or national law at the time of the 
killing. The Chamber came to the conclusion that there had been no such basis and found Latvia in 
breach of Article 7 (1) of the ECHR. Korbely concerned events during the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution. The Hungarian Supreme Court had upheld the conviction of the applicant who was a 
military commander at the time of the event. One of the central issues in this case was whether the 
person killed by the applicant or upon his order qualified – due to his surrender – as a person not 
taking part in the hostilities and therefore came under the protection of common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions. The ECtHR concluded that the domestic courts had not established that the 
victim expressed an intention to surrender and therefore found Hungary in breach of Article 7 of the 
ECHR. 
In summary, Bárd claimed that the ECtHR had been wrong in bringing the cases under Article 7 of the 
ECHR. Instead it should have examined the applications under Article 6, and if concerned about the 
irregularities of the trials and the arbitrary application of the relevant legal provisions, it should have 
found a breach of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The reason for the ECtHR’s choice in his view 
was that the Court in its effort not to question the legitimacy of using the Hungarian criminal process 
for coming to terms with the past did not wish to proclaim that the entire domestic trial had been 
unfair. Thus it appeared safer to bring the cases under Article 7. However, Bárd concluded, the Court 
had to pay dearly for its political discretion. 
In Kononov the Latvian government had “stressed the importance of such trials in restoring 
democracy, establishing the historical truth and guaranteeing justice for the victims of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes” and argued that “despite all the practical problems with which the Latvian 
authorities were faced, these trials were very important as they helped to make up for the inadequacies 
of the Nuremberg trial, a trial that had to a large extent been an example of justice for the victors, 




Bárd’s concern was that it could be unfortunate to expect criminal trials to record and write history in 
addition to establishing individual criminal responsibility. Having decided to decide the cases under 
Article 7 rather than Article 6, the Court had departed from the interpretation given to international 
law by the Latvian and Hungarian courts, and arrived at a re-assessment of the facts. He concluded: 
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The judgment of the Court demonstrates once more the difficulties to find the proper 
candidate for presenting a new account of history through trials conducted five decades after 
the events have taken place. 
 
6 Truth in the Communist Regimes 
A special issue of the German Law Journal in 2005 was devoted to “Confronting Memories”. The 
scene was set by Christian Joerges in his Introduction. He reminded the reader that “… history is a 
reflection on the past from the present, and we must be aware that the common identities that we forge 
and the narratives that we live with emerge from processes of remembering and forgetting.”
36
 
András Sajó, since 2008 the judge from Hungary at the European Court of Human Rights, illustrated 
the difficulties encountered when confronting issues of truth in countries such as his.
37
 He reminded 
his readers that in the period after WW II, the non-indoctrinated presentation of contemporary history 
was prohibited, partly because the Hungarian Communist regime used many Hungarian Nazis. The 
democratic governments of France did the same. And, for about forty years of German and Austrian 
politics, there were revelations that former Nazi party and SS members were working in high 
government positions.
38
 In Hungary, as in most East European countries, public reflection on past 
crimes was not part of the discussions that shape national identity: “History froze once again in 
lies.”
39
 The result, in the context of a refusal to consider responsibility, was that there was no serious 
calling to account of crimes committed under communism: “The prevailing attitude suggested that 
Hungarians had suffered enough for everything, and since individual responsibility was not practiced, 
there were no patterns for introspection or for collective introspection.”
40
 
Vivian Grosswald Curran, in the Epilogue entitled “Law's Past and Europe's Future” in the same 
Special Issue,
41
 cited Ruti Teitel as pointing out, in the context of states in transition, that because 
post-Communist countries had suffered from the historical revisionism that Communist governments 
practiced as part of their abuse and violation of truth and justice, these countries uniformly rejected 
redressing past crimes and offenses through the construction of a historical narrative along the model 
of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Hearings.
42
 
Eric Heinze of Queen Mary University of London, is leading a four-country project Memory Laws in 
European and Comparative Perspective (MELA).
43
 He has written a short blog introduction. The 
introduction
44
 to the project contains the following: 
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Most older Central and Eastern Europeans were indoctrinated with false information about 
Soviet conduct, such as the Molotov- Ribbentrop partition of Poland (1939). Similarly, the 
Kremlin long attributed the Katyń massacre to the Germans, although it was committed under 
Soviet command. Recent attempts to commemorate Stalinist crimes include the 1998 Polish 
laws against the denial of Soviet-era atrocities and the 2006 Ukrainian law against denying 
the Holodomor, the politics of mass starvation engineered by Joseph Stalin in 1932-33 to 
crush national autonomy movements. We must again ask how far that renewal of memory 
ought to extend. How legitimate are the Baltic states’ prohibitions on the denial of Soviet 
repression? How selective are EU resolutions commemorating Stalinist crimes? 
And Heinze concludes his blog as follows:
45
 
If you want to know where a state’s ethical compass lies, if you want to know its attitude 
towards human rights, then yes, look by all means at its official version of past events – but 
look above all at the freedom of its citizens to challenge that version. 
This follows from the principled position Heinze has taken on highly controversial issues of “no-
platforming”; as part of a broader examination of provocative speech, he has proposed a series of 
arguments for, but matched with stronger arguments against, censoring speakers.
46
 
However, Heinze raises in his blog another important problem, generally forgotten or ignored, again 
concerning one of the Baltic states, this time Lithuania. Heinze insists that: 
The lesson is one we must learn forever anew: a government’s legitimacy is reflected in the 
degree to which it tolerates its citizens lampooning and deriding it. Lithuanians have today 
gained the freedom to detest Zappa the man as loudly as they wish, along with any 
understandings of history that his image memorialises. 
To be sure, not all Lithuanian laws and practices are equally enlightened. Pandering to local 
post-Soviet nationalism, the state has brought a few nasty prosecutions against elderly 
Holocaust survivors on trumped-up charges of wartime collaboration. 
He is referring to a monument to Frank Zappa erected pursuant to a special law passed in 1992, 
following independence. This sculpture “…overtly satirises a chilling past, when ubiquitous, taboo-
laden images of state-approved heroes had been planted throughout Soviet-dominated nations.” But 
Heinze’s second reference is to events in 2008, when, as The Economist pointed out, some 
Lithuanians posed “… a series of false moral equivalences: Jews were disloyal citizens of pre-war 
Lithuania, helped the Soviet occupiers in 1940, and were therefore partly to blame for their fate. And 
the genocide that really matters was the one that Lithuanian people suffered at Soviet hands after 
1944.” This is what could be termed “Holocaust obfuscation”.  
The cases in question were those of Fania Brantsovsky, now 86, by 2008 a librarian at the Vilnius 
Yiddish Institute in Lithuania, a survivor of the Vilna Ghetto and a former partisan. Prosecutors said 
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 “Ten arguments for – and against – ‘no-platforming’. Eric Heinze sets out the flaws in the commonly heard 






they wanted to talk to her and another survivor, Rachel Margolis, about a (Soviet Red Army) partisan 
massacre of civilians in 1944. Furthermore, prosecutors wanted to interview Yitzhak Arad, a 
Lithuanian-born historian and ex-head of Yad Vashem in Israel. Until recently he had sat on a high-
level Lithuanian commission investigating crimes perpetrated by totalitarian regimes in the country. 
In 2008 he was refusing to co-operate. In a book published in 1979 he described how his (Soviet Red 
army) partisan unit “punished” villagers who did not give them food.
47
 
These cases are both remarkably reminiscent of the case of Kononov v. Latvia, already mentioned 
above. And there is strong relevance to the case in which I represented the applicant for more than six 




7 Cases Concerning Latvia, and its Illegal Occupation by the USSR 
Nils Muižnieks, a Latvian-American who was born on 31 January 1964 in the United States, has since 
1 April 2012 been the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe. He edited, in 2008 
and 2011, two major collections reflecting on the complexities of the three Baltic states and their 
engagement with crimes of their historical past.
49
  
His 2011 collection contained his own “Latvian-Russian Memory Battles at the European Court of 
Human Rights”, in which he reviewed (not in chronological order) a number of important Latvian 
cases at the European Court of Human Rights.
50
 At the outset he emphasized that “… what the court 
considers to be historical fact is more difficult for either side to contest at the political level, while the 
court’s interpretations of historical context also carry considerable legal weight, as both sides have 
accepted the jurisdiction of the ECHR and must implement its judgments.” Or, more accurately, it is 
the state which must implement the judgments.
51
 He noted that “… while the Latvian media have not 
devoted much coverage to the cases in question, Russia’s media have made several of the applicants 
from Latvia into heroes.”
52
 
This was the subject matter of the 2008 collection, and Muižnieks cited the chapter by Dmitrijs 
Petrenko, who found that “the Russian media portrayed military and KGB veterans in Latvia involved 
in various legal proceedings as an important subgroup of “compatriots” abroad under threat in Latvia, 
where the authorities are “inhumane” and “vengeful.” The plight of these individuals is portrayed as 
being typical of that of Russians in Latvia in general.”
53
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Muižnieks first turned to the 2010 Grand Chamber judgment in Kononov v. Latvia. He recognized that 
Kononov’s case raised (or could have raised, more accurately): “… a number of thorny questions 
related to history, accountability and law: can and should an individual who fought on the side of the 
Allies be tried for war crimes? Does it matter which ideology an individual claimed to be fighting for 
when determining criminal liability? What was the legal status of Latvia in 1944 at the time the events 
in question took place?”
54
 
In a controversial divided judgment ‒ I myself took the side of the dissenters, led by Judge Jean-Paul 
Costa
55
 ‒ the Grand Chamber on 17 May 2010 ruled in favor of Latvia , and determined Kononov 
could be punished for failing to meet the regulation criteria, specifically, wearing German Wehrmacht 
uniform while carrying out the crimes. The court determined the execution of the villagers was in 
violation of established international law at the time, as Kononov was only entitled to arrest them, and 
his conviction was not barred by statute of limitations. 
Muižnieks pointed out that the Grand Chamber “sought to skirt controversial historical issues, merely 
noting under “the Facts” that “In August 1940 Latvia became part of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics.” The judgment set out “the observations of the parties and third parties to the Grand 
Chamber” regarding Latvian history, but stressed in paragraph 210 that “The Grand Chamber 
considers (as did the Chamber, at paragraph 112 of its judgment) that it is not its role to pronounce on 
the question of the lawfulness of Latvia’s incorporation into the USSR, and in any event in the present 
case, it is not necessary to do so.”
56
 
Next he turned to the Grand Chamber judgments in Slivenko v. Latvia
57
 (2003) and Sisojeva v. 
Latvia
58
 (2007). In the rulings in both cases, the Court gave in his view a “rather anodyne” rendering 
of Latvian history, avoiding almost any comment on the issue. In the Sisojeva case, the Court noted 
that: “The first two applicants entered Latvian territory in 1969 and 1968 respectively, when the 
territory formed part of the Soviet Union.” (paragraph 17) In the Slivenko case, the Court merely 
noted that “Latvia regained independence from the USSR in 1991.” (paragraph 17) While the Court 
did not find any substantial violation of the applicant’s rights in the Sisojeva case, and struck it out, it 
ruled partially in favor of the applicant in the Slivenko case, under Article 8, in that Latvia should 
have taken into account the applicants’ particular circumstances.
59
 
In its decision of 18 December 2014 a Chamber of the ECtHR found two cases inadmissible, namely 
Larionovs v. Latvia
60
 and Tess v. Latvia.
61
 In both cases the Chamber found that Mr Larionovs and Mr 
Tess, the applicants, had failed to lodge a constitutional complaint that, if successful, could have led 
to the reopening of criminal proceedings and redress of the violation of Article 7 (no punishment 
without law) alleged by them. The Court consequently rejected their complaint for non-exhaustion of 
domestic remedies. Muižnieks commented that, in both cases, the Court had sought to avoid detailed 
comment on the historical context. The Court in an earlier (2008) partial admissibility decision in 
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Larionovs noted under “The Facts”: “after the annexation of Latvia by the USSR in summer 1940” 
and in neutral language “the deportation of Baltic peasants of 25 March 1949.” 
Muižnieks was more impressed by the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Ždanoka v. Latvia.
62
 It departed 
from its previous practice of avoiding significant commentary on historical issues and laid out in the 
section on “The Facts” how Latvia came to be a part of the Soviet Union and the events of 1990 and 
1991, mentioning the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocols, Soviet ultimatums to the 
interwar Latvian government, and the invasion and annexation of Latvia.
63
 Then, the Court drew an 
explicit link between the Soviet annexation and the Communist Party: 
Latvia, together with the other Baltic states, lost its independence in 1940 in the aftermath of 
the partition of Central and Eastern Europe agreed by Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet 
Union by way of the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, an agreement contrary 
to the generally recognized principles of international law. The ensuing annexation of Latvia 
by the Soviet Union was orchestrated and conducted under the authority of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (paragraph 119). 
Muižnieks interviewed the Latvian agent in the case, Inga Reine, and was given access to the (public) 
court papers including the Memorial I drafted, and my written submissions to the Grand Chamber. He 
noted:  
When the Latvian government provided the Court with a detailed account of the 
independence struggle supported by 26 scholarly annexes, Ždanoka beat a retreat, her legal 
counsel suggesting to the Court that “The Applicant does not wish to enter into a detailed 
discussion of the history of events in 1990-1991. These are in any event of limited relevance 
to her case” … In a document submitted to the Court, Ždanoka’s counsel sought to steer it 
away from the historical issues raised by the Latvian government: “the Grand Chamber is not 
the appropriate forum in which to re-open these issues, which will ultimately be decided by 
historians and by public opinion.”
64
 
Those are accurate quotations, but - indeed - the case did not require the Court to rule on issues of 
historical truth, nor did it. The issue was whether Latvia’s prohibition of the applicant’s candidacy for 
elections violated Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR; and the Grand Chamber held that the 
prohibition, contained in a Law of 1995 but relating to the applicant’s active membership of the 
Communist Party in early 1991, was within Latvia’s margin of appreciation – but would soon not be. I 
commented in detail on the judgment in publications in English and in Russian.
65
 
I have since been in communication with Nils Muižnieks, and here, as I sent it to him, is my own 
recollection. As was more frequently the case at that time, there were oral hearings before both the 
Chamber and the Grand Chamber. On 17 June 2004, following the hearing, a Chamber of the First 
Section, presided over by Judge Rozakis, delivered a judgment in which it held, by five votes to two, 
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that there had been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 11 of the Convention, Before 
the Chamber, Inga Reine argued law.  
As to the applicant’s present conduct, the Court noted that the criticisms levelled at her mainly 
concerned the fact that she defended and disseminated ideas diametrically opposed to the official 
policy of the Latvian authorities and were disapproved of by a large proportion of the population. 
With regard to her ideas concerning the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia and the legislation on 
language matters, the Court could not discern any sign of anti-democratic leanings or incompatibility 
with the fundamental values of the Convention. The same conclusion was inescapable as regards the 
means the applicant used to attain her political objectives. In short, the Government had not supplied 
information about any specific act by the applicant capable of endangering the Latvian State, its 
national security or its democratic order. Consequently, the Court considered that her permanent 
ineligibility to stand for election to the Latvian parliament was not proportionate to the legitimate 
aims it pursued, that it curtailed her electoral rights to such an extent as to impair their very essence 
and that its necessity in a democratic society had not been established. Judges Bonello and Levits 
dissented. 
Before the Grand Chamber, Inga Reine gave a much more political presentation, comparing the 
applicant to Milosevic, and implying that she should take responsibility for the crimes of Stalin. 
Indeed, the atmosphere in the Court was very highly charged. Following the oral submissions, a judge 
asked me the following question: “Mr Bowring! When did your client publicly apologise for having 
been a member of the Communist Party?” I was not sure there was such a requirement in human 
rights law. Another judge asked me: “Mr Bowring! When your client was naturalised a Latvian 
citizen did she not have to swear an oath of loyalty to Latvia?” To which the answer was that as a 
member of a family who had been living in Latvia for three generations, since the 19th century (her 
Jewish grandparents were murdered by the Nazis), she was entitled to Latvian citizenship as of right, 
although she had to go to court to vindicate it. The Latvian government tried very hard to find 
evidence of disloyalty by the applicant, but found none, as the Chamber had noted. 
The judgment was delivered on 16 March 2006, the day the Latvian former members of the Waffen 
SS march each year in Riga, Leģionāru piemiņas diena, and the applicant, regarding this as a 
deliberate provocation (which it probably was), refused to go to court on that day. I went to represent 
her. Outside the court, the Latvian lawyer who prepared the draft judgment, said to me in a jovial 
manner “Just wait to see what we have done with the jurisprudence!” Remarkably, a year or so later, 
the Latvian lawyer having left the Registry, he came to find me in London to apologize.  
The majority, by 13 votes to 4, held that Latvia’s ban was within its margin of appreciation. However, 
Latvia’s victory was conditional, unusually. The majority concluded (paragraph135): 
It is to be noted that the Constitutional Court observed in its decision of 30 August 2000 that 
the Latvian parliament should establish a time-limit on the restriction. In the light of this 
warning, even if today Latvia cannot be considered to have overstepped its wide margin of 
appreciation under [P1A3], it is nevertheless the case that the Latvian parliament must keep 
the statutory restriction under constant review, with a view to bringing it to an early end. Such 
a conclusion seems all the more justified in view of the greater stability which Latvia now 
enjoys, inter alia, by reason of its full European integration… Hence, the failure by the 
Latvian legislature to take active steps in this connection may result in a different finding by 
the Court. 
The strongly worded dissenting judgment of Judge Rozakis described the majority judgment as 





My own view is that Tatiana Ždanoka should be awarded a medal by Latvia for helping the ethnic 
Russians and Russian speakers to focus on Brussels and Strasbourg rather than Moscow. It is notable 
that in her two terms as an MEP ‒ the Latvian government failed to prevent her from standing, several 
members of the ruling party overslept and missed the vote on the question ‒ she has been a member of 
the European Free Alliance - Greens group. 
Muižnieks concluded his survey with the 2008 Chamber judgment in Ādamsons v. Latvia,
66
 a case 
quite different from that of Ždanoka. As he noted, the court kept well away from issues of history or 
historical truth. In his concurring opinion (joined by two other judges), Judge Garlicki said: “Nous 
sommes des experts en droit et en légalité, mais non en politique et en histoire, et nous ne devrions 




8 Some more recent Strasbourg cases 
In Vajnai v. Hungary,
68
 where the applicant was prosecuted for wearing a red star at a socialist 
demonstration, he argued that there was a profound difference between Fascist and Communist 
ideologies and that, in any event, the red star could not be exclusively associated with the “communist 
dictatorship”. In the international workers’ movement, the red star – sometimes understood as 
representing the five fingers of a worker’s hand or the five continents – had been regarded since the 
nineteenth century as a symbol of the fight for social justice, the liberation of workers and freedom of 
the people, and, generally, of socialism in a broad sense. The Court was (paragraph 52) “mindful of 
the fact that the well-known mass violations of human rights committed under communism 
discredited the symbolic value of the red star. However, in the Court’s view, it cannot be understood 
as representing exclusively communist totalitarian rule, as the Government have implicitly conceded. 
It is clear that this star also still symbolises the international workers’ movement, struggling for a 
fairer society, as well as certain lawful political parties active in different member States.” 
In another case against Estonia, in which I represented the applicants, Korobov and others v. 
Estonia,
69
 six applicants were arrested, allegedly violently, and were detained and some brutalised in 
detention. Ensuing attempts by the applicants to institute prosecution against the police failed. The 
Chamber in 2013 unanimously found a violation of Article 3 through the use of excessive force in the 
case of one applicant, and four applicants established violations of the procedural obligation implicit 
in Article 3, because Estonia had failed to carry out an effective and independent investigation of their 
allegations of ill-treatment.  
The context was the “Bronze Soldier” disturbances in 2007. Originally named a “Monument to the 
Liberators of Tallinn”, this statue was unveiled on 22 September 1947, on the third anniversary of the 
“liberation” in 1944. In fact, the Nazi Germans had retreated before the Red Army arrived, and on 18 
September 1944 the Provisional Estonian government (Estonia was an independent state from 1919 
until its annexation by the USSR following the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact) had declared independence, 
which was short-lived as Estonia was rapidly incorporated into the USSR. This was without doubt an 
illegal occupation and annexation.  
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At last, 47 years later, with the collapse of the USSR, Estonia regained its independence. In 2007, the 
Estonian Parliament enacted the Protection of War Graves Act; part of the “protective measures” 
proposed enabled the relocation of war graves currently in “unsuitable” sites. In April 2007, a large 
tent was put over the monument in preparation for the exhumation, and a police cordon formed. Over 
the nights of 26 to 28 April, thousands of people gathered, mainly Russian speakers, who protested at 
the exhumation. Things got out of hand, with stones being thrown, vandalism, and over 1,160 arrests 
made, including the applicants.
 70
  
It is notable that the Court was not asked to examine, much less to rule on, the historical background 
to the disturbances in which the applicants were detained, and refrained from touching on these 
contentious matters at all.  
Finally, in Sõro v. Estonia (2015),
71
 where from 1980 to 1991 the applicant was employed as a driver 
by the Committee for State Security, and under the 1995 Disclosure Act
72
 information as to that fact 
was published, the Court held:  
… in the applicant’s case the information in question was only published in 2004 - almost 
thirteen years after the restoration of the Estonian independence. The Court is of the opinion 
that any threat the former servicemen of the KGB could initially pose to the newly created 
democracy must have considerably decreased with the passage of time. It notes that it does 
not appear from the file that any assessment of the possible threat posed by the applicant at 
the time of the publication of the information was carried out.  
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8. But Judges Hajiyev, Laffranque and 
Dedov, the judge from Russia, elected in 2013, expressed a perhaps surprising joint dissenting 
opinion, in that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life was necessary 
in a democratic society and constituted a proportionate measure. In their view, the majority had 
“failed to see the overall context of this case and its consequences for Estonian society and security, to 
respect subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation and to leave any room for the respondent State and 
its courts to deal with sensitive issues of a moral, historical and political nature, given that there was 
no disproportionate interference with the applicant’s rights and no manifest errors or arbitrariness in 
the actions of the authorities, including the domestic courts.” 
They added:  
We reiterate that it is not the Court’s role to arbitrate on historical issues (compare 
Dzhugashvili v. Russia.) It must exercise caution when scrutinising decisions made in this 
connection by a democratically elected legislature wishing to draw a clear line between the 
former regime together with its oppressive institutions and the newly established democratic 
order, to offer reconciliation with the past and to help to make good past injustices. The 
expectations of society and the legislature’s choices in different countries inevitably differ in 
such matters, depending on their unique historical experience. In such matters the Court 
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should have due regard to the principle of subsidiarity and allow the States an appropriate 
margin of appreciation. 
 
9 Conclusion 
On 1 September 2016 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation re-wrote the history of the Second 
World War, in the words of two distinguished commentators.
73
 The Court upheld the conviction of 
Vladimir Luzgin under Article 354.1 of the Russian Criminal Code -- Rehabilitation of Nazism, a new 
provision enacted in 2014, two months after the Ukrainian Maidan Revolution (or Revolution of 
Dignity), criminalizing: 
[1] Denial of facts, established by the judgement of the International Military Tribunal…, [2] 
approval of the crimes adjudicated by said Tribunal, and [3] dissemination of knowingly false 
information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War, made publicly. 
Luzgin, a 38 year-old auto mechanic, was fined 200,000 rubles (roughly €2,800) for reposting on the 
popular Russian social networking site vkontakte a link to an online article containing numerous 
assertions in defense of Ukrainian nationalist paramilitaries that fought during the Second World War. 
The basis for Luzgin’s conviction lay in the statement that unlike the nationalists, “the 
Communists…actively collaborated with Germany in dividing Europe according to the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact,” and “Communists and Germany jointly attacked Poland and started the Second 
World War on 1 September 1939!” 
The new provision was the Russian response to the fact, on which I commented in detail above, that 
the Baltic states in particular, and Poland, claim as a matter of historical fact that the USSR had 
illegally occupied them both at the start of and then after the defeat of Nazism in World War II. In 
response, the Kremlin has accused these states of rehabilitating Nazism, and has endorsed a heroic 
vision of Soviet history with the victory in the “Great Patriotic War” at its core. As Bogush and 
Nuzov point out, the Russian regime regards the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939 that 
divided Poland between Germany and the USSR positively, calling it a “colossal achievement of 
Stalin’s diplomacy.” The pact also permitted the annexation by the USSR of the three Baltic states, 
hitherto independent, as well as part of Romania. 
The Supreme Court upheld Mr Luzgin’s conviction because by restating the historical claim that the 
USSR and Germany both attacked Poland in September 1939, he assisted in the “rehabilitation of 
Nazism” and formation of belief in the “negative activity of the USSR in the Second World War.” 
In fact, he was telling the truth. 
Bogush and Nuzov. cite Perinçek v. Switzerland,
74
 where the Grand Chamber questioned the 
existence of a “pressing social need” to punish radical historical opinions, and found a violation of 
Article 10 in Perinçek’s conviction under a law of 1995 criminalizing “Racial Discrimination” for 
statements denying the characterization of massacres of Armenians in 1915 as genocide. The Grand 
Chamber held, by 10 votes to 7, that there had been a violation of Article 10. The separate opinions 
were (a) a partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Nußberger; (b) a joint dissenting 
opinion of Judges Spielmann, Casadevall, Berro, De Gaetano, Sicilianos, Silvis and Kūris;, and (c) an 
additional dissenting opinion of Judge Silvis, joined by Judges Casadevall, Berro and Kūris. 
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The majority’s arguments have been summarized as follows: 
1) The applicant’s statements bore on a matter of public interest and did not amount to a call for 
hatred or intolerance (paragraphs 229-241); 
2) The context in which they were made had not been marked by heightened tensions or special 
historical overtones in Switzerland (paragraphs 242-248); 
3) The statements could not be regarded as affecting the dignity of the members of the Armenian 
community to the point of requiring a criminal law response in Switzerland (paragraphs 272-273); 
4) There was no international law obligation for Switzerland to criminalize such statements 
(paragraphs 258-268); 
5) The Swiss courts appeared to have censured Perinçek simply for voicing an opinion that diverged 
from the established ones in Switzerland, and the interference with his right to freedom of expression 
had taken the serious form of a criminal conviction (paragraphs 274-282). 
One commentator concluded: 
The problem with the Strasbourg judgment in Perinçek is not that the Court defends freedom 
of speech under Article 10 ECHR. Historical discussion should be exempted from 
instrumental state censorship in a democratic state, even if that implies protection of a “bunch 
of clowns outside” and “negligible contribution to public discourse”. The problem is that 
while acknowledging the dignity of the Armenian community under Article 8 ECHR, the 
Court fails to express the necessary outrage about Perinçek’s statements… In combination 
with an extremely questionable hierarchy between the Holocaust and other genocides, this 
failure to distance from Perinçek – albeit rightly protecting his freedom of expression – leaves 
strikingly little to sustain the dignity of the Armenian victims.
75
 
It is highly likely that Mr Luzgin’s case, if it reaches the Strasbourg Court, will also be dealt with as a 
freedom of expression issue under Article 10. He is represented by my EHRAC
76
 colleague Kirill 




However, freedom of expression is not engaged in cases concerning criminal prosecutions under 
retrospective legislation for fighting on the “wrong” side in World War II, where extremely 
controversial issues will arise as to the moral equivalency or not of Nazism and Stalinism, and as to 
whether the crimes of the Allies should be treated in the same way as the crimes of the defeated 
Nazis. 
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